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SHOULD ENVIRONMENTAL MONETARY SANCTIONS 
BE TAX DEDUCTIBLE? 
John C. Smith* 
Conventional wisdom assumes that environmental monetary 
sanctions should not be allowed as a deduction from income taxes. 
This Comment advances the counter-intuitive argument that un-
der the present statutory framework, allowing some environ-
mental monetary sanctions to be tax deductible is consistent with 
sound environmental policy and social values. Properly structur-
ing sentences and settlements to be tax deductible and to keep 
the money local maximizes the resources that can be brought to 
bear in remediating the harm without diminishing the deterrent 
effect. 
INTRODUCTION 
The basic public policy justification advanced for not allowing tax-
payers to deduct environmental monetary sanctions from their in-
come tax is that the government should not bear any part of the cost 
of reprehensible behavior, even if incurred in the normal course of a 
trade or business.1 This is based, in part, upon the belief that allowing 
a deduction would enable the taxpayer to externalize the sanction and 
eviscerate the punitive scheme of the penalty.2 If one accepts the 
premise that illegal, antisocial and other undesirable behavior can be 
deterred by monetary sanctions, then a deductible monetary sanction 
can have the same deterrent impact as a nondeductible fine or similar 
penalty, provided that the deductible monetary sanction is increased 
* Articles Editor for the BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1995-
1999, and Certified Public Accountant. I respectfully acknowledge Zygmunt J.B. Plater for his 
inspiration and guidance during the writing of this article. 
1 See Jacob L. Todres, Internal Revenue Code Section 162(f); An Analysis and Its Application 
to Restitution Payments and Environmental Fines, 99 DICK. L. REV. 645, 650 (1995). 
2 See id. 
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to account for the value of the deduction.3 For example, a $650,000 
nondeductible fine or similar penalty is economically equivalent to a 
$1,000,000 deductible monetary sanction that reduces the taxpayer's 
income tax liability by $350,000.4 In each case, the after-tax cost to 
the taxpayer would be $650,000. If payments of income tax and mone-
tary sanctions are paid into the federal treasury, allowing a deduction 
would add a level of complexity without any benefit.6 
While environmental statutes often provide for monetary sanctions 
in the form of fines and similar penalties to punish and deter violators,6 
these sanctions frequently do not remedy the local harm caused by 
the offense or eliminate (or reduce) the risk of future harm because 
the payments must be made to the federal government.7 However, it 
is possible for judges and attorneys to keep the money local rather 
than allowing it to go into the federal treasury by carefully delineating 
the amount that is a fine, from that which is restitution or some other 
form of court imposed monetary sanction.8 If the goal of the statute 
giving rise to the monetary sanction is to protect the environment, 
how should such structuring of sentences and settlements be re-
garded?9 
3 Cf John Y. Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes, and Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25 
TAX L. REV. 611, 615 (1970) (arguing that the deterrent effect is altered in proportion to the 
taxpayer's marginal tax bracket). 
4 Cf Todres, supra note 1, at 651-52 (discussing the value of deductions in various tax 
brackets). 
5 See Taggart, supra note 3, at 615. If deductibility is permitted, the deterrent impact of a 
fine cannot be consistently maintained by raising the amount of the fine. See id. Since the 
alteration is in proportion to the taxpayer's tax bracket, this factor would have to be taken into 
account when raising the amount of the fine. See id. 
6 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 869-70 (2d ed. 1998) (An Introduction to ... Environmental Statutory Design). 
7 See Martin Harrell, Organizational Environmental Crime and the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984: Combining Fines with Restitution, Remedial Orders, Community Service, and Proba-
tion to Benefit the Environment while Punishing the Guilty, 6 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 243, 247, 
272-76 (1995) (discussing the requirement of payments to be paid to the federal treasury as a 
result of the following legislation: u.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; Miscellaneous Receipts Statute, 
Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 11, 9 Stat. 398 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (1982» 
(preventing federal agencies from spending money for their own causes by requiring it to be 
deposited in the Treasury for use as Congress directs); Anti-Deficiency Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1905, 
ch. 1484, § 4, 33 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1351 (1982» (prohibiting 
government employees from spending money in excess of amounts available through Congres-
sional appropriations or obligating the federal government to pay money prior to appropriation 
by Congress); 42 U.S.C. § l06Ol(b) (requiring most criminal fines to be deposited into a special 
account in the Department of Treasury known as the Victim Crime Fund to be used to pay for 
victim compensation and assistance programs». 
8 See id. at 275. 
9 ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: 1996-1997 CUMULA-
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This Comment argues that under the present statutory framework, 
allowing some environmental monetary sanctions to be tax deductible 
is consistent with sound environmental and social values. lo Carefully 
structuring sentences and settlements so that tax deductible pay-
ments fund local beneficial environmental projects maximizes the eco-
nomic resources available to remediate the harms that gave rise to 
the environmental monetary sanctions.ll Continuing with the above 
example, this Comment argues that it is better for the environment 
to allow a tax deductible $1,000,000 monetary sanction paid to estab-
lish a beneficial environmental project (e.g. a Supplemental Environ-
mental Project) to remediate the harm caused by the violation, than 
it is to pay $650,000 into the federal treasury. 
The key to bringing the maximum resources to bear against the 
environmental damage is to structure the sentence or settlement so 
that tax deductible monetary sanctions are kept local.12 The current 
tax laws explicitly disallow a deduction "for any fine or similar penalty 
paid to a government for the violation of any law."13 To determine the 
scope of this provision, it is helpful to use an analytical framework 
similar to that used by Congress when it enacted the law.14 Accord-
ingly, the question as to which environmental monetary sanctions 
should be tax deductible must be viewed both from the standpoint of 
tax policy and from the standpoint of environmental policy.15 
Section I of this Comment reviews the current tax laws with re-
spect to deducting fines and similar penalties to see which, if any, 
environmental monetary sanctions are tax deductible. The section 
parses the statutory language and examines the relevant Treasury 
Regulation and case law for the criteria to distinguish environmental 
monetary sanctions between deductible and nondeductible amounts. 
Section II examines whether monetary sanctions should be tax de-
TIVE MANUAL FOR TEACHERS 76 (1996). "If prosecutors negotiating penalties wish to have 
penalty funds used for on-site remedies rather than merely pouring into the federal treasury, 
tax deductibility is a settlement incentive. Can such SEPs be made deductible? ... Is such tax 
deductibility a good idea?" PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 895. 
10 This article focuses on whether or not I.R.C. § 162(0 is applicable to environmental mone-
tary sanctions. It does not address whether deductible payments should be expensed immedi-
ately or must be capitalized. 
11 Cf Harrell, supra note 7, at 275 (discussing structuring monetary sanctions). 
12 See id. 
13 See I.R.C. § 162(0 (1997). 
14 C.f. S. REP. No. 91-552 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2311 (enacting legisla-
tion dealing with the deductibility of antitrust damage payments in which the U.S. Senate stated 
that "[tjhe question as to whether antitrust treble damage payments should be deductible must 
be viewed both from the standpoint of antitrust policy and from the standpoint of tax policy"). 
16 See id. 
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ductible from an environmental perspective. The section first looks at 
the extent of penalties intended for criminal actions, as well as civil 
and administrative actions. The section then reviews case law to see 
how courts have treated these sanctions in environmental cases. Sec-
tion III combines salient points of Sections I and II to show that in 
either a criminal or civil action, monetary sanctions can be structured 
so that some payments are tax deductible and stay local to help those 
most affected by the harm. Moreover, such structuring may also make 
it possible to obtain a tax deduction that can be factored into setting 
the sentence or settlement. For taxpayers with limited economic 
resources, this allows for larger assessments that can be used to 
remediate the harm and provide relief to the victims. 
1. TAX PERSPECTIVE 
From the standpoint of tax policy, there has been a reluctance to 
disallow business expense deductions because of the notion that an 
income tax should only be imposed on business income after deducting 
all actual expenses.16 During the Senate debate in 1913 on the bill that 
became the first modern income tax law, amendments were rejected 
that would have limited the deductions for losses to those incurred in 
a "legitimate" or "lawful" trade or business.17 Senator Williams, who 
was in charge of the bill, stated on the floor of the Senate that: 
[T]he object of this bill is to tax a man's net income; that is to say, 
what he has at the end of the year after deducting from his 
receipts his expenditures or losses. It is not to reform men's moral 
characters; that is not the object of the bill at all. The tax is not 
levied for the purpose of restraining people from betting on horse 
races or upon "futures," but the tax is framed for the purpose of 
making a man pay upon his net income, his actual profit during 
the year. The law does not care where he got it from, so far as the 
tax is concerned, although the law may very properly care in 
another way.18 
The validity of this position is bolstered by the obvious difficulties 
confronting the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) when it is forced to 
undertake the disallowance of deductions for expenses of illegal or 
16 See id. 
17 See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966). 
18 [d. at 691-92 (citation omitted). This 1966 case was the last I.R.C. section 162(a) public policy 
case to come before the United States Supreme Court and occurred before the 1969 amendment 
which added section 162(0. See Todres, supra note 1, at 661. 
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improper activities which other state or federal agencies have not 
sought to challenge.19 The IRS is not equipped to serve as a junior 
Department of Justice or state attorney generapo 
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that "an income tax 
deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that the burden of 
clearly showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the tax-
payer."21 Traditionally, taxpayers have attempted to claim deductions 
for fines and settlements under section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code (I.R.C.).22 Section 162(a) states the general rule that "[t]here 
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying out any 
trade or business."23 In 1969, Congress amended section 162 to deny 
deductions for the following four types of expenditures:24 first, fines 
or similar penalties paid to a government for the violation of any law;25 
second, a portion of treble damage payments under the antitrust laws 
following a related criminal conviction (or plea of equity or nolo con-
tendere);26 third, deductions for bribes paid to public officials (whether 
or not foreign officials);27 fourth, and other unlawful bribes or "kick-
19 See Taggart, supra note 3, at 615. 
20 See id. 
21 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (quoting Interstate Transit Lines 
v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943». 
22 See Edward Schnee, Some Fines and Penalties Can be Deducted, 58 TAX'N FOR ACCT. 20, 
20 (1997). Other sections of the Internal Revenue Code, that are used less frequently to claim 
an income tax deduction, include section 165, which authorizes deductions of certain losses, and 
section 170, which authorizes deduction of certain charitable contributions and gifts. See, e.g., 
Stephens v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 108, 112 (1989) (concluding that at a minimum, the consid-
erations involved in applying section 162(f) extend to determination of deductibility under 
section 165(c)(2»; Rev. Rul. 79-148, 1979-1 C.B. 93, 93-94 (holding contribution to charity in lieu 
of fine is not deductible under I.R.C. § 162(f) or § 170). 
23 I.R.C. § 162(a). 
24 See Todres, supra note 1, at 647-48. 
26 See I.R.C. § 162(f). 
26 See id. § 162(g). Congress's 1969 amendments to section 162 were most likely spurred by 
the IRS's ruling five years earlier. See Todres, supra note 1, at 647. Under section 4 of the 
Clayton Act, a person injured by an antitrust violation may sue for damages and recover three 
times the amount of economic loss established. See S. REP. No. 91-552 (1969), reprinted in 1969 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2311. The 1964 Revenue Ruling 64-224 held that amounts paid or incurred 
in satisfaction of treble damage claims under that act were fully deductible as ordinary and 
necessary business expenses. See id. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 amended section 162 so that 
if a taxpayer is convicted in a criminal proceeding for the violation of Federal antitrust laws (or 
pled guilty or nolo contendere), then no deduction is to be allowed for two-thirds of any amount 
paid on any judgment for damages against the taxpayer or for settlement of any action brought 
under section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act. See id. at 2312. 
27 See I.R.C. § 162(c)(I). This amendment expanded code section 162(c) (and renumbered it 
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backs.''28 The Senate Report for the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (Senate 
Report) noted that there was "no statutory provision setting forth a 
general 'public policy' basis for denying deductions which are 'ordi-
nary and necessary' business deductions. Nevertheless, a number of 
business expenses ha[d] been disallowed on the ground that the al-
lowance of these deductions would be contrary to Federal or State 
'public policy."'29 The Senate Report further noted: 
There still remains ... the question as to what is an ordinary and 
necessary business expense. The Supreme Court in the Tank 
'l'ruck Rental case, for example, in holding that the payment of 
fines could not be considered as ordinary and necessary, stated: 
"A finding of 'necessity' cannot be made however, if allowance of 
the deduction would frustrate sharply defined national or State 
policies proscribing the particular types of conduct evidenced by 
some governmental declaration thereof." 
On the same grounds, it appears appropriate to deny deductions 
for bribes, illegal kickbacks, and the penalty portion of antitrust 
treble damage payments.30 
Apparently-conflicting statements in the Senate Report have gen-
erated much litigation concerning the deductibility of payments, as 
well as the possible continuing validity of the pre-1969 "public policy" 
doctrine.31 The Senate Report indicated that Congress intended the 
provision for the denial of deductions for payments in these situations 
162(c)(I» so as to deny a section 162(a) deduction for any illegal bribe or kickback given to an 
official or employee of any government. See 'lbdres, supra note 1, at 648. The prior section 162(c) 
only applied to payments made to foreign government officials. See id. 
28 See I.R.C. § 162(c)(2). This amendment in its original form denied a section 162(a) deduction 
for any illegal bribe or kickback given to someone other than a government official or employee 
where the taxpayer had been convicted (or pled guilty or nolo contendere) in a criminal 
proceeding for making the payment. See 'lbdres, supra note 1, at 648 & n.S. It was significantly 
changed by section 310(a) of the Revenue Act of 1971. See id. 
29 S. REP. No. 91--552 at 2310. Prior to the 1969 amendments, the courts used two approaches 
to disallow deductions. See 'lbdres, supra note 1, at 653--54. The first approach held that the 
expenses failed to qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162(a). 
See id. at 654. This approach was problematic when courts wanted to disallow deductions for 
expenses that normally would qualify as ordinary and necessary expenses under the statute. 
See id. at 654. The second approach held that even if the expenses qualified as ordinary and 
necessary expenses under section 162(a), the deduction would be disallowed for reasons of public 
policy. See id. at 653. This approach required the court to overrule a statute that expressly 
allowed deductions of all ordinary and necessary business expenses. See id. Disparate and 
inconsistent outcomes resulted from the unchecked proliferation of ''public policy" exceptions 
of obscure distinctions. See id. at 653--54. 
so See S. REP. No. 91--552 at 2311. 
31 See Schnee, supra note 22, at 21. For a more thorough discussion of public policy consid-
erations and the pre-I969 "Public Policy" doctrine, see Todres, supra note 1, at 653--64. 
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to be all inclusive.32 It specifically stated that "[p]ublic policy, in other 
circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to justify 
the disallowance of deductions."33 Yet, when discussing the specific 
provision, the Senate Report also stated that "[t]his provision is to 
apply in any case in which the taxpayer is required to pay a fine 
because he is convicted of a crime (felony or misdemeanor) in a full 
criminal proceeding in an appropriate court. This represents a codi-
fication of the general court position in this respect."34 
Section 162(0 of the I.R.C. states in its entirety, "[n]o deduction 
shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any fine or similar penalty 
paid to a government for the violation of any law.''35 The starting point 
for analyzing the statute is to examine each key statutory phrase.36 
A. " ... any Fine or Similar Penalty ... " 
The statutory language of section 162(0 does not define the scope 
of the phrase "any fine or similar penalty," however, the language 
suggests that fines are a broader category than penalties.37 While all 
fines are included within the section 162(0 disallowance, only those 
penalties which are "similar" to fines are included.38 Courts give sub-
stantial weight to the Department of the Treasury's regulations.39 
Although the Treasury Regulations expand on the wording used in 
the I.R.C., they do not supply a unique definition.40 As a consequence, 
32 See S. REP. No. 91-552 at 2311. 
38 [d. 
34 See id. at 2311-12. 
36 I.R.C. § 162(0 (1997). 
36 See 'Ibdres, supra note 1, at 669. 
37 See id. 
38 See id.; see also True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1990) ("A common 
sense reading indicates to us that the addition of the words 'similar penalty' reflects an intent 
to include more than just criminal fines, but not all penalties."). 
39 See, e.g., Cottage Sav. & Loan v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1979) ("Because 
Congress has delegated to the Commissioner the power to promulgate 'all needful rules and 
regulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code],' 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a), we must 
defer to his regulatory interpretations of the Code so long as they are reasonable, see National 
Muffier Dealers Ass'n. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)"); True, 894 F.2d at 1202 ("The 
court's role in reviewing Treasury Department regulations is very limited .... As a general rule, 
Treasury regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the 
revenue statutes. 'In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the congressional 
mandate in a proper manner, [courts] look to see whether the regulation harmonizes with the 
plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose."') (citation omitted) (quoting National 
Muffler Dealers Ass'n., 440 U.S. at 477)). 
40 See Schnee, supra note 22, at 21. Treasury Regulation section 1.162-21(b)(1), states that a 
fine or similar penalty includes an amount-
442 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:435 
there has been considerable litigation concerning the scope of section 
162(0 and the regulation.41 
1. Payments That Are Specifically Included in the Definition of a 
Fine or Similar Penalty 
The first "fine or similar penalty" specifically included by the Treas-
ury Regulations is an amount "paid pursuant to a conviction or a plea 
of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere for a crime (felony or misde-
meanor) in a criminal proceeding."42 
The second payment specifically included in a "fine or similar pen-
alty" by the Treasury Regulations is an amount paid as a civil penalty 
imposed by federal, state, or locallaw.43 Almost immediately after 
section 162(0 was enacted, the question arose as to what extent the 
enacting provision applied to civil penalties." It is now generally 
accepted that civil penalties which are designed to punish or deter 
taxpayers are nondeductible, while civil penalties that are remedial 
or compensatory are deductible.46 The distinction between punitive 
and remedial civil penalties is far from obvious.46 
(i) Paid pursuant to conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for a crime (felony 
or misdemeanor) in a criminal proceeding; 
(ii) Paid as a civil penalty imposed by Federal, State, or local law ... ; 
(iii) Paid in settlement of the taxpayer's actual or potential liability for a fine or penalty 
(civil or criminal); or 
(iv) Forfeited as collateral posted in connection with a proceeding which could result 
in imposition of such a fine or penalty. 
Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(1). 
41 See Schnee, supra note 22, at 21. 
42 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(I)(i). 
43 See id. at § 1.162-21(b)(I)(ii). 
44 See Taggart, supra note 3, at 646. In the course of amending section 162(c) in the Revenue 
Act of 1971, the Senate Finance Committee set forth its earlier intent with respect to section 
162(0. See S. REP. No. 92--437 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1918, 1980. "In approving 
the provisions dealing with fines and similar penalties in 1969, it was the intention of the 
committee to disallow deductions for payments of sanctions which are imposed under civil 
statutes but which in general terms serve the same purpose as a fine exacted under a criminal 
statute .... " Id. However, because post-enactment commentary is not necessarily controlling, 
the problem persists as to whether section 162(0 applies to civil penalties. See Thdres, supra 
note 1, at 666. 
45 See Schnee, supra note 22, at 22; 8ee, e.g., Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 
T.C. 497, 652 (1980); Middle Atl. Distrib., Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1136, 1143 (1979). But 
see Colt Indus., Inc. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1311, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding Congress did 
not intend to distinguish between deductible and nondeductible civil penalties). 
46 See Schnee, supra note 22, at 22. 
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In the landmark case of Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. 
Commissioner, the Tax Court distinguished between punitive versus 
remedial civil penalties.47 The court analyzed the legislative history of 
section 162(0's "fine or similar penalty" phrase, stating: 
Congress, by use of the word "similar," was not intending to 
distinguish between criminal and civil sanctions, but rather was 
intending to make a distinction between different types of civil 
penalties. If a civil penalty is imposed for purposes of enforcing 
the law and as punishment for the violation thereof, its purpose 
is the same as a fine exacted under a criminal statute and it is 
"similar" to a fine. However, if the civil penalty is imposed to 
encourage prompt compliance with a requirement of the law, or 
as a remedial measure to compensate another party for expenses 
incurred as a result of the violation, it does not serve the same 
purpose as a criminal fine and is not "similar" to a fine within the 
meaning of section 162(t) .... 48 
The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that section 162(0 
should only apply to penalties imposed on the commission of an act 
evidencing "reprehensible conduct" which normally accompanies the 
violation of a criminal laW.49 The court stated that ''the appropriate 
consideration is not the type of conduct which gives rise to the viola-
tion resulting in the penal imposition but is the purpose which the 
statutory penalty is to serve."60 
While most courts and the IRS have concluded that some civil fines 
are deductible,61 despite variations in how to distinguish among vari-
ous civil fines,62 the conclusion is not unanimous.53 In Colt Industries 
v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit interpreted the same legislative history to conclude that all 
civil and criminal fines, with the exception of late filing charges or 
interest charges to encourage prompt compliance with filing or other 
requirements, are nondeductible.64 
47 S66 Southern Paci,fic, 75 T.C. at 652; 'lbdres, supra note 1, at 668 & nn.136--38. 
48 S66 Southern Paci,fic, 75 T.C. at 653. 
49Id. 
50 Id. 
6! S66, 6.g., id. at 652; Middl6 Atlantic, 72 T.C. at 1143; Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,596 (Sept. 26, 
1986). 
62 Compare, 6.g., Southern Pacific, 75 T.C. at 653, and Middle Atlantic, 72 T.C. and 1143 
(distinguishing punitive from remedial), with True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197, 1204 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (distinguishing retributive from compensatory or remedial). 
68 See Schnee, supra note 22, at 23. 
64 S66 Colt Indus., Inc. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1311, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The court 
reasoned: 
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The third "fine or similar penalty" specifically included by the 
Treasury Regulations is an amount "paid in settlement of the tax-
payer's actual or potential liability for a fine or penalty (civil or crimi-
nal)."55 While section 162(f) does not specifically address whether 
settlement or compromise payments are within its ambit, the statute's 
silence is meaningful.56 When Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act 
of 1969, it explicitly required a conviction (or plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere) for sections 162(g) and 162(c)(2), but omitted such re-
quirements for sections 162(f) and 162(c)(1).57 The failure to state any 
such requirement for section 162(f) suggests that none was intended.58 
Courts have routinely held that settlement and compromise payments 
are within section 162(f), and that section 1.162-21(b)(1)(iii) of the 
regulations is valid. 59 
The determination of whether a settlement payment is a penalty 
under section 162(f) is made using the "origin of the liability" test.60 
For example, in Middle Atlantic Distributors v. Commissioner, the 
Tax Court, in determining whether the settlement payment was de-
ductible or not, stated that "the character of the payment involved 
depends on the origin of the liability giving rise to it."61 After noting 
that the statute under which the claim was made had dual purposes, 
the court based its decision on an inquiry into whether the claim was 
The [1971 Senate Finance] committee's comments were to clarify that civil penalties, 
as well as criminal, are within the ambit of section 162(0, not an effort to distinguish 
between deductible and nondeductible civil penalties. The committee emphasized that 
it "did not intend to liberalize the law in the case of fines or penalties." To the extent 
that it recognized an exception to the nondeductibility of civil penalties, the committee 
said only that the deduction of ''late filing charges or interest charges" imposed to 
"encourage prompt compliance with filing or other requirements" is not barred. 
Id. at 1313 (citations omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 92-437 (1971), reprinted in 1971 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1825, 1918). 
65 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(I)(iii). 
66 See Todres, supra note 1, at 699. 
67 Compare I.R.C. § 162(g) (1969) and § 162(c)(2) (1969) (statutes having explicit requirement 
that there be a conviction or plea of guilty or nolo contendere), with § 162(0 (1969) and § 162 
(c)(I) (1969) (statutes not having such requirement). 
68 See Todres, supra note 1, at 699 (citing Taggart, supra note 3, at 647-48). 
69 See, e.g., Colt Industries, 880 F.2d at 1314; Adolf Meller Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1360, 
1364 (Ct. CI. 1979). 
60 See, e.g., Middle Atl. Distrib., Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1136, 1144-45 (1979). The U.S. 
Supreme Court set forth the "origin and character ofthe claim" test in United States v. Gilmore. 
See 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963). The Court held that "the origin and character of the claim with respect 
to which an expense was incurred, rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of 
the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of whether the expense was ... deductible or not." 
Id. 
6! See Middle Atlantic, 72 T.C. at 1144-45. 
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made in respect to the statute's compensatory purposes or for the 
purpose of punishing culpable behavior.52 The court concluded that at 
all times during the settlement negotiations, the United States was 
only seeking reimbursement for lost revenue, without the intent to 
punish or deter, and thus the payment was deductible.63 
It should be noted that in Middle Atlantic, the court gave effect to 
the parties' characterization of the payment only after it had deter-
mined that the governing statute had a dual purpose.64 This does not 
necessarily mean that the parties' characterization of a penalty as 
deductible will be given effect by the court when there is a single 
purpose statute to the contrary. 56 However, in instances where the 
settlement agreement characterizes a civil penalty as nondeductible, 
presumably such characterization will be given effect.66 
In General Counsel Memorandum 39,596, the IRS used a two-part 
analysis to discuss the deductibility of payments made in a settlement 
agreement for violations of the Anti-dumping Act of 1921.67 The first 
prong of the analysis examined the punitive or remedial character of 
the statute.66 The second prong of the analysis examined the effect of 
the settlement agreement on whether the payment should be viewed 
as a fine or similar penalty.69 The IRS explained that although this 
agreement, by its terms, was not binding on the Department of the 
Treasury, it provided further evidence of the remedial rather than 
punitive nature of the settlement.7o After examining the facts and 
circumstances, the IRS concluded that the settlement payments were 
deductible by reasoning that not only is the settlement payment not 
a fine or similar penalty in its own right because of the underlying 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 1145. 
64 See Todres, supra note 1, at 676. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. at 676 n.I94. 
67 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,596 (Sept. 26, 1986). 
68 See id. The IRS stated: 
We interpret ... the term "remedial" ... to include those monetary exactions in which 
there is a compensatory or computational nexus between the amount of the exaction 
and the harm or injury done to the exacting government ... or to third parties that 
the government is attempting to protect. We do not ... include[] within the scope of 
the term "remedial" those penal or punitive exactions enacted to enforce the law even 
though such exactions may be aggregated in a fund to mitigate the harm or injury 
caused by the proscribed action or conduct. 
[d. (interpreting Middle Atlantic). 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
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remedial nature, but it is further precluded from being a nonde-
ductible fine or similar penalty by the express language of the settle-
ment agreement.71 
In Revenue Ruling 79-148, the IRS suggested that once a payment 
is determined to be a fine or similar penalty under the normal requi-
sites, any settlement in lieu of such amount will automatically remain 
within section 162(f).72 In the underlying case, the taxpayer pled no 
contest and was convicted for unlawfully selling products to a foreign 
country in violation offederallaw.73 Before any fine was imposed, the 
taxpayer offered to make a contribution to a charitable organization 
equal to the maximum fine that could be imposed.74 At sentencing, the 
court suspended the taxpayer's sentence, placed him on probation, 
and directed him to pay the charitable contribution.75 The IRS relied 
on Regulation section 1.162-21(b)(I)(iii) to conclude that the charita-
ble payment was nondeductible under section 162(f).76 The IRS rea-
soned that the taxpayer's payment to the charitable organization was 
in lieu of having to pay a fine to the federal government.77 
Dicta in S & B Restaurant v. Commissioner questioned whether 
the institution of a legal proceeding prior to reaching a settlement was 
a necessary precondition to the application of section 162(f).78 Al-
though there is no specific requirement of a legal proceeding in section 
162(f), the Tax Court noted that there is some indication that Con-
gress may have intended such a requirement.79 However, the court 
71 See id. 
72 See Rev. Rul. 79-148, 1979-1 C.B. 93, 93-94. The weight to be accorded Revenue Rulings is 
unclear. Compare Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472,484 (1990) ("Although the Service's 
interpretative rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations ... we give an agency's 
interpretations and practices considerable weight where they involve the contemporaneous 
construction of a statute and where they have been in long use.'') (citations omitted), with 
Johnson City Med. Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 976 (6th Cir. 1993) ("a revenue ruling is 
entitled to some deference unless 'it conflicts with the statute it supposedly interprets or with 
that statute's legislative history or if it is otherwise unreasonable"') (citations omitted), and 
Stubbs, Overbeck & Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (5th Cir. 1971) ("A 
ruling is merely the opinion of a lawyer in the agency and must be accepted as such. It may be 
helpful in interpreting a statute, but it is not binding on ... the courts. It does not have the 
effect of a regulation or a Treasury Decision.") (citations omitted). 
73 See Rev. Rul. 79-148, 1979-1 C.B. at 93. 
74 See id. 
76 See id. 
76 See id. at 94. 
77 See id. 
78 See S & B Restaurant, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1226, 1234 (1980). 
"19 See id. (citing S. REP. No. 91--552, 274 (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 423, 597; H. CONF. REP. No. 
91-782, 331-332 (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 644, 676-77 (in connection with section 902 of the Tax 
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also noted that requiring the institution of legal proceedings before 
settlement is reached, as a precondition to denying the tax deduction, 
could present a serious problem by encouraging taxpayers "to pay 
early and get the deduction."SO 
The last payment specifically included in a fine or similar penalty by 
the Treasury Regulation is an amount "forfeited as collateral posted 
in connection with a proceeding which could result in imposition of 
such a fine or penalty.''Sl 
2. Payments That Are Specifically Excluded from the Definition of 
a Fine or Similar Penalty 
Treasury Regulation section 1.162-21(b)(2) excludes certain pay-
ments from the definition of a fine or similar penalty.82 "The amount 
of a fine or penalty does not include legal fees and related expenses 
paid or incurred in the defense of a prosecution or civil action arising 
from a violation of the law imposing the fine or civil penalty .... "83 
More importantly, the Treasury Regulation also excludes "[c]ompen-
satory damages ... paid to a government."84 It is not clear how strictly 
the courts enforce the "paid to a government" component under this 
exclusion.86 
3. Restitution 
a. Criminal Actions 
While it is clear that a criminal fine is not deductible, courts are 
split as to whether restitution payments are deductible under section 
169(f).86 The deciding factor appears to be whether the payment is 
classified as a fine (nondeductible), or as a compensatory payment 
Reform Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 710); S. REP. No. 92-437, 72-74 (1971), 1972-1 C.B. 559, 559-000 
(in connection with section 310 of the Revenue Act of 1971, 85 Stat. 525». 
80 See id. 
81 See Treas. Reg. § 1.l62-21(b)(1)(iv). 
82 See id. § 1.l62-21(b)(2). 
8S Id. 
84 Id. 
86 Cf. infra Section I.B (discussing "paid to a government" requirement of I.R.C. § 162(1). 
86 Compare Waldman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1384, 1386, 1389 (1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 611 (9th 
Cir. 1988), and Stephens v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 108, 113 (1989) (holding that restitution paid 
to victims, made to obtain a stay of sentencing, is a nondeductible fine or similar penalty), with 
Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667, 674 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'g 93 T.C. 108 (1989), and Spitz 
v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 148, 149--50 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (holding that restitution paid to a 
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(deductible).87 In Waldman v. Commissioner, the taxpayer's entire 
prison sentence was stayed on the condition that he pay specified 
amounts of restitution to his victims.88 The Tax Court disallowed the 
deduction because the "payments ... were ... in satisfaction of ... 
criminal liability to the state."89 The court reasoned that ''had [the 
taxpayer] pled not guilty, and had he been subsequently acquitted, 
the court could not have ordered payment of restitution."90 The court 
noted that since restitution was not a substitute for a civil action to 
recover damages, it can not be considered compensatory.91 The court 
held that the restitution payments met the definition of a "fine or 
similar penalty" because they were paid pursuant to his plea of guilty, 
and under the state penal code, restitution was a deterrent to future 
criminality imposed for the purpose of enforcing the law.92 
In Stephens v. Commissioner, the court also held that restitution 
payments were nondeductible.93 The taxpayer was convicted on sev-
eral counts of embezzlement and was sentenced to several concurrent 
prison terms and substantial fines.94 The sentencing judge suspended 
one of the prison terms and substituted probation on the condition 
that the taxpayer make restitution.96 The Tax Court stated: 
It is equally clear that the restitution payment involved herein 
was made as the result of a criminal conviction and that it was 
ordered in lieu of an additional prison term and as a condition of 
probation. That the payment had the effect of reimbursing [the 
victim] for all or part of its loss and, therefore, had a civil aspect, 
does not detract from this overriding fact.96 
Yet on appeal, Stephens was reversed by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which held that the restitution 
payment was not a fine or similar penalty under section 162(0 because 
victim, even though required to avoid incarceration, is not a fine or similar penalty, but rather 
is deductible because it is compensatory). 
87 See Stephens, 905 F.2d at 672-73. 
88 See Waldman, 88 T.C. at 1387. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's 
decision "substantially for the reasons stated by the Tax Court." See Waldman v. Commis-
sioner, 850 F.2d 611, 611 (9th Cir. 1988). 
89 See Waldman, 88 T.C. at 1389. 
90 [do at 1387. 
91 See ido 
92 [d. at 1387-88. 
93 See Stephens v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 108, 113 (1989). 
94 See id. at 109. 
95 See id. 
96 [do at 113 (citation omitted). 
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it was primarily a remedial measure to compensate another party and 
was paid to an individual, rather than the government.97 The Second 
Circuit, in allowing the deduction, expressly declined to decide if 
either condition alone would be sufficient to make the payment of 
restitution outside the scope of section 162(f).98 It distinguished Wald-
man, noting that the defendant's entire sentence was suspended on 
the condition that he make restitution, and thus the purpose of the 
Waldman's payment was equally compensatory and punitive in na-
ture.99 By contrast, the court noted that only one of Stephens' several 
concurrent prison terms was suspended and conditioned on restitu-
tion for the primary, not "incidental", purpose of reimbursing the 
victim.loo In Stephens, the defendant's sentence consisted of inc arc era-
tion, fines, and an order to make restitution, supporting the inference 
that the restitution payment was compensatory in nature and not in 
the nature of a fine or penalty.10l The restitution payments were 
imposed in addition to the fine, not in lieu thereof.lOO 
As demonstrated in Stephens, it is possible for the monetary sanc-
tions imposed by the sentencing court to consist of both nondeductible 
and deductible components. lOS In Stephens, the Sixth Circuit observed 
that: 
Stephens' situation resembles that of the petitioners in Mason 
and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. United States, whose fine for trucking 
violations were punitive and not deductible, but whose liquidated 
damages payments were compensatory and therefore deductible. 
While the fines Stephens paid as part of his punishment are obvi-
ously not deductible, we find that the restitution payment, which 
is compensatory in nature, is deductible.104 
b. Civil and Administrative Actions 
To determine the deductibility of restitution payments in civil ac-
tions, the payments must be classified as either "fines or similar pen-
97 Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667, 672-74 (2d Cir. 1990). 
98 See iii. at 672. The court stated, '''!\vo considerations drawn from section 162(0 and the cases 
construing that provision combine to support our conclusion in this case. Whether either 
consideration alone would suffice is a matter we need not decide." Id. 
99 See iii. at 673. 
100 See iii. 
101 See iii. 
III! See Stephens, 905 F.2d at 674. 
100 See iii. at 673. 
11M Id. (citations omitted). 
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alties'" or "compensatory damages paid to the government."l06 Fines 
or similar penalties must be further analyzed to determine if they are 
punitive or remedial.I06 The tax treatment of the payment depends on 
the origin of the liability rather than the use to which the payment is 
put. 107 
In Bailey v. Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit upheld the Tax 
Court's use of section 162(0 to disallow the taxpayer's deduction for 
restitution payments. lOS The district court judge at sentencing im-
posed a fine and then allowed it to be applied as restitution in a 
settlement of a multi-district class action that was pending against 
the taxpayer's corporation and officers.109 The court's order authoriz-
ing the transfer expressly stated that "the ultimate disposition of 
these funds in no way shall alter their status as civil penalties."llo The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, reasoning that under the cir-
cumstances, the civil penalty was a fine imposed for purposes of 
enforcing the law and as punishment for a violation thereof.111 The 
court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the payment was not a 
penalty paid to a government, but rather constituted restitution paid 
to private litigants.112 The court stated: 
The fact that the . . . district court, upon Bailey's application, 
permitted him to apply the ... civil penalty toward the settlement 
of his potential liabilities in the multidistrict class action does not 
change the status of the payment as a civil penalty. The charac-
terization of a payment for purposes of § 162(t) turns on the origin 
of the liability giving rise to it. 113 
B. " ... Paid to a Government . .. " 
The next key statutory phrase in section 162(0 requires that the 
fine or similar penalty be "paid to a government."114 Treasury Regu-
lation section 1.162-21(a) states: 
106 See LR.C. § 162(0 (1997); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-21(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2). 
1011 See supra Section LA.1.(ii). 
107 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
1011 See Bailey v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 1985). 
109 See id. at 46. 
llO See id. 
III See id. at 47. 
112 See id. at 46-47. 
llS Bailey, 756 F.2d at 47 (citations omitted). 
114 See LR.C. § 162(0 (1997). 
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In general. No deduction shall be allowed under section 162(a) for 
any fine or similar penalty paid to---
(1) The government of the United States, a State, a territory or 
possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; 
(2) The government of a foreign country; or 
(3) A political subdivision of, or corporation or other entity serv-
ing as an agency or instrumentality of, any of the above.u6 
Technically, this requirement seems relatively straightforward and 
noncontroversial.U6 In reality, the cases and revenue rulings either 
ignore the "paid to a government" requirement or piggyback this 
requirement onto the "fine or similar penalty" requirement.ll7 Al-
though this approach gives the courts greater flexibility in fashioning 
alternative remedies which they deem nondeductible under section 
162(0, it ignores the literal requirements of that section which im-
poses both the "fine or similar penalty" requirement and the "paid to 
a government" requirement. us 
Some courts treat certain payments to a nongovernment recipient 
as "paid to a government."U9 In Waldman v. Commissioner, the Tax 
Court held that the taxpayer's restitution payments to his victims as 
a condition of staying the execution of his prison sentence met the 
"paid to a government" requirement.12O The court reasoned: 
The State ... exercised complete control over the ultimate dispo-
sition of petitioner's payments. The court ordered petitioner to 
pay specified amounts of restitution to specified victims and in-
formed him that "If the court and the victims are not satisfied that 
things are going along as they should be, we will not hold a 
probation violation hearing; I will simply dissolve the stay of 
execution and you will be committed to State Prison." We do not 
believe that a Government must actually "pocket" the fine or 
penalty to satisfy the "paid to a government" requirement of 
section 162(t). Petitioner's "fine or penalty" was "paid to a govern-
ment" and is not deductible.121 
116 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(a). 
116 See Todres, supra note 1, at 705. 
117 See ill. at 713. 
118 See ill. at 708. 
119 See, e.g., Waldman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1384, 1389 (1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 
1988); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2672 (1992), aff'd without opinion, 
54 F.3d 767 (3d Cir. 1995). But see Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667, 672-74 (2d Cir. 1990). 
120 See Waldman, 88 T.C. at 1387, 1389. 
121 [d. at 1389. 
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Other courts, and at times the IRS, basically ignore the "paid to a 
government" requirement. l22 In Bailey v. Commissioner, the tax-
payer argued that section 162(f) was not applicable because the pay-
ment was made to private litigants rather than "paid to a govern-
ment."123 The Sixth Circuit ignored the taxpayer's argument, holding 
that the origin of the liability was in punishment for violating the 
Federal Trade Commission Act and the payment's character as a 
nondeductible fine remained unchanged even though it was received 
by victims.l24 In a subsequent case, the Sixth Circuit held that a 
restitution payment made to a private, nongovernmental entity, was 
nondeductible under section 162(f), and cited Bailey without discuss-
ing the "paid to a government" requirement.126 
Similarly, the IRS in Revenue Ruling 74-148 concluded that a court 
directed payment to a charitable organization instead of a govern-
ment was a nondeductible fine under section 162(f).126 The IRS looked 
to the origin of the liability and held that an amount paid to someone 
other than the government can still be a nondeductible fine under 
section 162(f).127 
On the other hand, certain payments to the government may be 
treated as paid to a nongovernment recipient. l28 In Spitz v. United 
States, the taxpayer was ordered to pay restitution to his victim as a 
condition of probation.129 In holding that the restitution payment was 
deductible because it constituted neither a fine nor a penalty, the court 
concluded that "although the payment was funneled through the 
State Department of Public Welfare, it was paid to [the victim], not 
'to a government' within the meaning of [section] 162(f)."130 
122 See Todres, supra note 1, at 706. 
123 See Bailey v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d 44, 46 (6th Cir. 1985). 
124 See id. at 46-47. 
125 See Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 298-99 (6th Cir. 1993). 
126 See Rev. Rul. 79-148, 1979-1 C.B. 93, 93-94. 
127 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,465 (Aug. 19, 1985). 
128 See Schnee, supra note 22, at 21. 
129 432 F. Supp. 148, 149 (E.D. Wis. 1977). 
130 See id. at 149-50. The court in Waldman critically pointed out that the court in Spitz: "(a) 
never explained how the State court, in a criminal proceeding, could determine Spitz's liability 
to his victim; (b) never focused on the fact that the restitution was ordered as a condition of 
probation; and (c) never focused on Supreme Court of Wisconsin precedent that restitution is 
part of the rehabilitative process in that it forces a defendant to live up to his financial 
responsibilities." See Todres, supra note 1, at 689 (discussing how the court in Waldman 
criticized the opinion in Spitz). 
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C. " ... For the Violation of Any Law." 
The final requirement under the statutory language of section 
162(0 is that the fine or similar penalty paid to a government be "for 
the violation of any law."131 The legislative history of this requirement 
is silent and no case law exists which interprets this statutory 
phrase.l32 However, the regulations make clear that the law violated 
need not be a federal law, but could be a state or local law. 133 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
From the standpoint of environmental policy, the basic issues in 
determining whether monetary sanctions should be tax deductible are 
the extent of the penalties intended by the underlying environmental 
statute, and whether the impact of the penalties should be reduced 
by permitting them to reduce taxes which otherwise would have been 
paid. 1M 
A. Extent of Penalties Intended 
1. Criminal Actions 
In the federal system, the Attorney General has plenary authority 
to investigate and prosecute criminal violations of the nation's envi-
ronmentallaws and to settle such cases.l36 Congress enacted the Sen-
tencing Reform Actl36 in 1984 for the primary purposes of decreasing 
lSI See I.R.C. § 162(f) (1997). 
1112 See Todres, supra note 1, at 709. 
ISS See id. at 709 n.410 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(I)(i) (referring to a conviction, plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere in a criminal proceeding, without limiting it in any way); § 1.162-
21(b)(I)(ii) (referring specifically to a civil penalty imposed by federal, state or local law); 
§ 1.162-21(c) exs. (6), (7) and (8) (discussing violations of a state maxinIum vehicle weight law, 
state environmental and local housing code, respectively». 
134 Cf. S. REP. No. 91-552 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2311 (enacting legis-
lation dealing with the deductibility of antitrust damage payments in which the U.S. Senate 
stated that "[f]rom the standpoint of antitrust policy, the basic issues are the extent of the 
penalties intended and whether their impact should be reduced by permitting them to reduce 
taxes which otherwise would have to be paid',). 
1116 See Harrell, supra note 7, at 279 & 279 n.195 (citing inter alia 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 
(reserving litigation to the Department of Justice); United States v. Morgan, 222 U.S. 274, 282 
(1911) (prosecuting attorney has authority to enforce criminal laws which is not diminished 
without a "clear and unambiguous expression of legislative will"». 
138 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 991-998 (1994 & Supp. I 1995); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (1994»; see Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop 
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unwarranted sentencing disparity, increasing sentencing uniformity 
and certainty, and for some select offenses to increase sentence sever-
ity.137 The Sentencing Reform Act provides that sentences must be 
responsive to the goals of: just punishment for the offense, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.13B This commitment to multi-
ple goals represents a substantial shift in sentencing from the prior 
overwhelming emphasis on rehabilitation to the current emphasis on 
just punishment and deterrence.139 The Sentencing Reform Act cre-
ated the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Commission) to promulgate 
guidelines and policy statements for federal district court judges to 
use in determining the type and duration of sentences to be imposed 
on offenders of federal crimes.140 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Man-
ual (Guidelines) promulgated by the Commission is applicable to sen-
tencing convicted individuals, as well as corporate and other organ-
izational defendants.14l 
a. Sentencing Individuals 
For convicted individuals, the Guidelines took effect on November 
1, 1987, and apply to all offenses committed on or after that date. l42 
The Guidelines require the court to order restitution for most offenses 
unless full restitution has already been made or "the court determines 
that the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process re-
sulting from the fashioning of an order of restitution . . . outweighs 
the need to provide restitution to any victims."l43 
M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theo-
retical Underpinnings, and SO'YYUJ Thoughts about their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 206 n.6 
(1993). Ilene H. Nagel is a member of the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Commission) and also 
co-chaired an advisory group of outside experts to consider issues relevant to the development 
of environmental sanctions for convicted organizations. See id. at 205, 254-55. Winthrop M. 
Swenson is Deputy General Counsel and Legislative Counsel of the Commission. See id. at 205. 
The views expressed do not necessarily represent those of the Commission. See id. 
137 See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 136, at 205-06. 
138 See id. at 207. 
139 See id. 
140 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(a), 994(a). The Commission is a full-time, bipartisan, independent 
agency in the judicial branch created to develop and implement a consistent, just and rational 
sentencing policy. See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 136, at 206-07. 
141 U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1995) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.J. The Commission 
has the authority to submit amendments to Congress each year, between the beginning of a 
regular congressional session and May 1. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p). Such amendments automat-
ically take effect 180 days after submission unless a law is enacted to the contrary. See id. 
142 See U.S.S.G., supra note 141, at 10 (historical note). 
143 See id. § 5El.l commentary at 287-88 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663(d». "The court shall-
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The Guidelines also require that "[t]he court shall impose a fine in 
all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to 
pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine."l44 A table of fines 
specifies the minimum and maximum amounts for each offense, but 
the limitation on the maximum fine does not apply if the defendant is 
convicted under a statute authorizing a fine for each day of the viola-
tion.l46 Environmental statutes frequently carry per diem fine provi-
sions.146 In such cases, "the court may impose a fine up to the maxi-
mum authorized by the statute."147 The Guidelines list factors that the 
court must consider in determining the amount of the fine,148 and state 
"[t]he amount of the fine should always be sufficient to ensure that 
the fine, taken together with other sanctions imposed, is punitive."149 
If the defendant is ordered to make restitution and to pay a fine, the 
court is to order that any money paid by the defendant shall first be 
applied to satisfy the order of restitution.l50 
In addition to monetary sanctions, the court has nonmonetary sanc-
tions that it can use to address environmental crimes.161 The Guide-
lines left the courts with a significant amount of discretion in setting 
prison sentences for environmental criminals.l62 Furthermore, the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 makes probation a sen-
tence in and of itself.l63 Probation may be used as an alternative to 
incarceration provided that the terms and conditions of probation can 
be fashioned so as to meet fully the statutory purposes of sentenc-
ing.1M If the court imposes an order of restitution or a fine, the Guide-
lines recommend that the court impose a condition on probation and 
(1) enter a restitution order if such order is authorized under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663--3664; or (2) if 
a restitution order would be authorized under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663--3664, except for the fact that 
the offense of conviction is not an offense set forth in TItle 18, United States Code, or 49 U.S.C. 
§ 46312, § 46502, or § 46504, impose a term of probation or supervised release with a condition 
requiring restitution." [d. § 5E1.l(a). 
144 [d. § 5El.2(a). 
145 See id. § 5E1.2(c)(3)-(4). 
148 See Gary S. Lincenberg, Sentencing Environmental Crimes, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1235, 
1253-54 (1992) (citing Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6928(d) (1988); Clean Water Act (CWA) § 309,33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(I) (1988». 
147 See U.S.S.G., supra note 141, § 5El.2(c)(4). 
148 See id. § 5E1.2(d). 
149 [d. § 5El.2(e). 
160 See id. § 5E1.l(c). 
161 See id. § 5F. 
162 See Lincenberg, supra note 146, at 123!h'l9 (discussing the development and application of 
the Guidelines to environmental crimes). 
163 See 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (1994); U.S.S.G., supra note 141, § 5B introductory commentary at 
274. 
164 See U.S.S.G., supra note 141, § 5B1.l introductory commentary at 274. The statutory 
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supervised release which requires the defendant to make payment or 
adhere to a court order installment schedule for payment.l56 
b. Sentencing Corporations and Other Organizations 
Convicted corporations and other organizational defendants are 
sentenced under Chapter 8 of the Guidelines, which became effective 
November 1, 1991.156 Throughout history, the sentencing of corpora-
tions has proven to be problematic because there is "no soul to damn: 
no body to kick."I57 While the centerpiece of the Guidelines for sen-
tencing these defendants is the fine range,l56 environmental offenses 
are specifically excluded from the fine provisions.159 For environ-
mental offenses, the sentencing judge must determine the appropri-
ate fine by applying pre-Guidelines general sentencing principles.160 
The over-arching reason why the Commission elected to postpone 
coverage of environmental offenses from the Guidelines is based on 
agreement by the commissioners that these might be sufficiently 
different to warrant special treatment.161 Four principal considera-
tions led to the Commission's decision to defer coverage.l62 
The first [consideration] was the potential difficulty in many en-
vironmental cases of defining and computing loss-a key measure 
of offense seriousness under the existing corporate Guidelines. 
purposes of sentencing include promoting respect for law, providing just punishment for the 
offense, achieving general deterrence, and protecting the public from further crimes by the 
defendant. See id. 
156 See id. § 5B1.4(b)(15), (16). 
156 See id. § 8A1.1-E1.3. "Organization" means "a person other than an individual." 18 U.S.C. 
§ 18. "The term includes corporations, partnerships, associations, joint-stock companies, unions, 
trusts, pension funds, unincorporated organizations, governments and political subdivisions 
thereof, and non-profit organizations." U.S.S.G., supra note 141, commentary at 338. 
157 See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry 
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981). The complete 
quote, attributed to Edward, First Baron Thurlow 1730-1806 is: "Did you ever expect a corpo-
ration to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?" Id. 
One version reports that he then added in a stage whisper, "[alnd by God, it ought to have both." 
Id. at n.1 (quoting H.L. MENCKEN, A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS ON HISTORICAL 
PRINCIPLES FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN SOURCES, 223 (1942)). 
158 See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 136, at 210. 
159 See U.S.S.G., supra note 141, § 8C2.1 commentary at 346. 
160 See Lincenberg, supra note 146, at 1257; see also U.S.S.G., supra note 141, § 8C2.1 com-
mentary at 346 (directly referring to U.S.S.G., supra note 141, § 8C2.10 which then refers to 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3353, 3572). 
161 See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 136, at 256. The Justice Department shared this view, 
and accepted the Commission's consensus to defer coverage. See id. 
162 See id. 
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Loss in environmental cases can be especially difficult to deter-
mine .... 
A second reason why environmental offenses were considered 
to be somewhat different from other offenses relates to the legal 
question of scienter. Under various environmental statutes, unlike 
most other areas of criminal law, a defendant corporation can be 
convicted on a showing of negligence, or in some cases without 
any showing of specific or general intent .... 
The third reason ... is that, arguably, more than other kinds of 
offenses, environmental violations are subject to overlapping en-
forcement schemes and collateral sanctions. State and local en-
forcement of environmental violations, for example, can be more 
co-extensive with federal enforcement efforts than is the case 
with other frequently committed organizational offenses .... 
The fourth principal reason ... is because opinion is so divided 
as to how to balance concerns for the environment with concerns 
for corporate effectiveness .... In the environmental context, 
these positions appear to be felt passionately, each believing in 
the moral virtue of their position.l63 
Even though the fine provisions do not apply to environmental 
offenses, the provisions on restitution and probation continue to ap-
ply.l64 A sentencing court's structuring of restitution, remedial condi-
tions, community service, and probation must have some nexus to the 
offense.l66 
The Guidelines state that as a general principle, the court should 
require that the organization take all appropriate steps to provide 
compensation to victims and otherwise remedy the harm caused or 
threatened by the offense.l66 A restitution order or an order of proba-
tion requiring restitution can be used to compensate identifiable vic-
tims of the offense.167 The court may also impose an order of notice to 
victims so that notice is given to yet unidentified victims of the of-
fense. l68 
Direct monetary sanctions are generally preferable to indirect 
monetary sanctions, except where the convicted organization pos-
sesses knowledge, facilities, or skills that uniquely qualify it to repair 
the damage caused by the offense.169 In such cases, community service 
163 [d. at 256-58 (citations omitted). 
164 See U.S.S.G., supra note 141, § 8ALl commentary at 338. 
166 See Lincenberg, supra note 146, at 1259 & 1259 n.I42. 
166 See U.S.S.G., supra note 141, § 8B introductory commentary at 343. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. 
169 See id. § 8B1.3 commentary at 344. Since community service can be performed by an 
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directed at repairing the damage may provide an efficient means of 
remedying the harm.170 A remedial order or an order of probation 
requiring community service can be used to reduce or eliminate the 
harm or threatened harm which would otherwise not be remedied.17i 
Moreover, a remedial order requiring corrective action by the organi-
zation may be necessary to prevent future injury from the instant of-
fense, e.g., a cleanup order for an environmental violation.l72 Yet, a 
court order may be unnecessary where a governmental regulatory 
agency, e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has 
authority to order remedial measures.l73 If a remedial order is entered 
by the court, it should be coordinated with any administrative or civil 
actions taken by the appropriate governmental regulatory agency.174 
An organization convicted of a crime must be sentenced to a term 
of probation if the sentence imposed on the organization does not 
include a fine.176 The Guidelines also specify other instances of when 
a court "shall" impose probation, e.g., if necessary to secure payment 
of a monetary penalty or restitution, enforce a remedial order, ensure 
completion of community service, or ensure that the changes are 
made within the organization to reduce the likelihood of future crimi-
nal conduct.176 However, such conditions must fulfill statutory require-
ments that they: (1) are reasonably related to the nature and circum-
stances of the offense or the history and characteristics of the 
organization; and (2) involve only such deprivations of liberty or prop-
erty as are necessary to effect the purposes of sentencing.l77 
The Commission has worked persistently to draft comprehensive 
guidelines for organizational defendants convicted of environmental 
offenses.178 In 1991, the Commission assembled an advisory group, 
comprised of two commissioners and sixteen lawyers from the public 
and private sectors, to further study and make recommendations as to 
appropriate methods for calculating organizational fines for environ-
mental offenses. l79 In November, 1993, this Advisory Working Group 
organization only by employing its resources or paying its employees or others to do so, it is an 
indirect monetary sanction. See id. 
I'lUSee id. 
17l See U.S.S.G., supra note 141, § 8B introductory commentary at 343. 
172 See id. § 8B1.2 commentary at 344. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
176 See id. § 8Dl.l commentary at 368; 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c} (1994). 
176 See U.S.S.G., supra note 141, § 8Dl.l(I}, (6). 
177 See id. § 8D1.3(c}; 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b}. 
1'18 See Harrell, supra note 7, at 266. 
179 See Douglas A. Berman, Editor's Observations, 8 FED. SENTENCING R. 204, 204 (1996). 
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on Environmental Sanctions submitted to the Commission a proposed 
fine-setting guideline for these offenses. l80 The proposal, drafted as 
Chapter 9, was written as an additional chapter for the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Manual.181 The Commission has yet to formally act on 
the proposal, though it has indicated that Chapter 9 remains a prior-
ity.l82 
2. Civil and Administrative Actions 
The federal environmental statutes generally contemplate that the 
EPA Administrator, rather than the Attorney General, should com-
mence civil or administrative actions.1&'l Remedies sought in civil and 
administrative cases are usually selected and approved by the 
Agency.l84 If EPA decides to seek civil judicial relief, the Department 
of Justice represents it in federal court.l85 Additionally, EPA has 
administrative enforcement authority totally independent of the De-
partment of Justice.l86 
When violations are found pursuant to a citizen suit, federal courts 
have the authority to impose civil penalties, to order parties to come 
into compliance, and to order injunctive relief.187 At least one commen-
tator has called for an expansion in the court's use of judicial equitable 
discretion, including the use of monetary sanctions to fund Supple-
ISO See id. 
181 See id. The full text of the proposal is on Lexis. See Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines 
for Environmental Violations Nov. 16, 1993, [24 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 
1378 (Nov. 26, 1993), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, ER file. Discussion of a dissent filed 
by two members of the Advisory Group urging the Commission to reject the draft can also be 
found on Lexis. See Enforcement: Dissent Filed by Advisory Group Members Urges Sentencing 
Commission to Reject Draft, [24 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BN A) 1594 (Jan. 7, 1994), 
available in LEXIS, BNA Library, ER file. 
182 See Berman, supra note 179, at 204. 
183 See Harrell, supra note 7, at 280 n.199 (citing Clean Water Act (CWA) § 309,33 U.S.C. 
§ 1319(a), (g) (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6928(a) (1988». 
1&1 See Harrell, supra note 7, at 279 (citing CWA § 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g». 
185 See id. at 279 & n.l96 (citing CWA § 506, 33 U.S.C. § 1366 ("Administrator shall request 
the Attorney General to appear and represent the United States in any civil or criminal action 
instituted under this chapter"». 
186 See id. at 279. 
187 See Quan B. Nghiem, Comment, Using Equitable Discretion to Impose Supplemental 
Environmental Projects Under the Clean Water Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 561, 561 
(1997). EPA defines SEPs as "environmentally beneficial projects which a violator agrees to 
undertake in settlement of an enforcement action, but which the violator is not otherwise legally 
required to perform. See EPA, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, EPA 
CIVIL PENALTY POLICIES (May 8, 1995), available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Penlty file, 1995 
CPP LEXIS 7 [hereinafter 1995 EPA CIVIL PENALTY POLICIES]. 
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mental Environment Projects (SEPs), to remedy harms caused by the 
violation of environmental laws.l88 As' authority, this commentator 
cites Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court stated that "[u]nless a statute in so many words, or by a 
necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction 
in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and 
applied."l89 
The federal environmental statutes set forth various factors which 
EPA or a court must consider in determining an appropriate pen-
alty.1OO In administrative litigation, the penalty sought by EPA is 
based upon the Agency's applicable penalty policy and the specific 
facts of the case.19l If EPA does not have an applicable penalty policy 
for the relevant statute, the penalty sought by EPA is based on the 
statutory factors governing penalty assessment, case law interpret-
ing such factors, and the facts of the particular case.l92 
In settling all civil and administrative actions, EPA requires alleged 
violators to promptly cease the violations and, to the extent possible, 
remediate any harm caused by the violations.l93 EPA also seeks sub-
stantial monetary penalties to deter future violations by the same 
violator or other members of the regulated community, and to create a 
national level playing field by ensuring that the violators do not obtain 
an unfair economic advantage over their competitors who made the 
necessary expenditures to comply in a timely manner.l94 In the settle-
ment context, when EPA establishes a penalty, it considers such 
factors as the economic benefit associated with the violations, the 
gravity or seriousness of the violation, and the prior history of viola-
tions.l96 EPA also considers evidence of a violator's commitment and 
ability to perform a SEP in establishing a settlement penalty.l96 
EPA encourages the use of SEPs.1!r7 While penalties play an impor-
tant role in environmental protection by deterring violations and 
creating a level playing field, a SEP can play an additional role in 
188 See Nghiem, supra note 187, at 563. 
189 See id. at 581--82 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982». 
190 See EPA, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, EPA CIVIL PEN-
ALTY POLICIES (Dec. 15, 1996), available in LEXIS, Envim Library, Penlty file, 1996 CPP 
LEXIS 1 [hereinafter 1996 EPA CIVIL PENALTY POLICIES]. 
191 See id. 
19l!See id. 
193 See 1995 EPA CIVIL PENALTY POLICIES, supra note 187, at 4. 
lIN See id. at 4-5. 
196 See id. at 5. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. at 6. 
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securing significant environmental or public health protection and im-
provements.l98 Although SEPs may not be appropriate in settlement 
of all cases, they are an important part of EPA's enforcement pro-
gram.1OO In exercising its enforcement discretion to determine 
whether a settlement is appropriate, EPA's calculation of the final 
penalty in a settlement which includes a SEP is a five-step process.200 
First, the Agency penalty policies are used to calculate the minimum 
amount that would be necessary to settle the same case without a 
SEP.201 The minimum amount necessary to settle the case without a 
SEP is calculated as the economic benefit of noncompliance plus the 
gravity component of the penalty.202 The gravity component is all 
of the penalty other than the identifiable economic benefit amount, 
after gravity has been adjusted by all other factors in the penalty 
policy (e.g., audits, good faith, litigation considerations), except for the 
SEP.203 Second, the Agency calculates the minimum penalty amount 
with a SEP, as the greater of the economic benefit of noncompliance 
plus ten percent of the gravity component, or twenty-five percent of 
the gravity component only.2M Third, the Agency calculates the SEP 
cost.206 The net after-tax cost of the SEP, hereinafter called the "SEP 
COST," is the maximum amount that EPA may take into considera-
tion in determining an appropriate penalty mitigation for perform-
ance of a SEP.206 Although EPA does not offer tax advice on whether 
the violator may deduct SEP expenditures from its income taxes, it 
does consider whether or not the violator will deduct the SEP in 
calculating the net SEP cost to the defendant to determine whether 
it will accept the proposed settlement.207 Fourth, the Agency calcu-
198 See Final EPA Supplemental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,796, 24,797 (1998). A 
full copy of this policy is set forth in the Federal Register and also may be found at EPA's web 
site at http://www.epa.gov/oecalsep. See id. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. at 24,801. The Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy specifically 
states that the settlement penalty calculation methodology is not intended for use at a hearing 
or in a trial. See id. at 24,797. 
201 See id. at 24,801. 
2a.!See id. 
2W See 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,801. 
204 See id. 
206 See id. 
206 See id. Generally, EPA will only accept SEPs that have a negative cash flow to the 
defendant. See id. at 24,802. 
2m See id. at 24,802. If a defendant/respondent states that it will not deduct the cost of a SEP 
from its income taxes and is willing to commit to this in the settlement document and provide 
the agency with certification upon the completion of the SEP that it has not deducted the SEP 
expenditures, the SEP cost is calculated without reduction for taxes. See id. If a business is not 
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lates the SEP Mitigation Amount, which is the percentage of the SEP 
COST (calculated pursuant to step three) that may be applied as 
mitigation against the amount EPA would settle for but for the SEP.208 
This percentage is set by EPA, based upon an evaluation of whether 
and how effectively a SEP achieves specific factors established under 
the policy.209 Fifth, the minimum final settlement penalty allowable 
based on the performance of the SEP is the greater of the minimum 
penalty amount with a SEP (step two), or the settlement amount 
without a SEP (step one) less the SEP Mitigation Amount (step 
four).21o 
B. Case Law Considering Tax Deductibility 
The second issue from the standpoint of environmental policy is 
whether the impact of amounts expended due to environmental vio-
lations should be reduced by permitting them to reduce taxes which 
otherwise would have been paid.211 To date, there have been only four 
cases that discuss the deductibility of environmental monetary sanc-
tions:212 Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner;213 True v. United 
States;214 Colt Industries, Inc. v. United States,215 and; S & B Restau-
rant, Inc. v. Commissioner.216 
In Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner, the taxpayer pled nolo 
contendere to 940 counts of permit violations for discharging manu-
willing to make this commitment, the business's marginal tax rate is used to calculate the 
after-tax SEP cost. See id. 
208 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,802. 
209 See id. The percent of penalty mitigation is within EPA's discretion; there is no presumption 
as to the correct percent of mitigation. See id. As a general guideline, the final mitigation 
percentage considered acceptable by EPA will not exceed 80% of the SEP cost. See id. at 24,802. 
However, for small businesses, government agencies or entities, non-profit organizations, or 
where the SEP develops and implements pollution prevention techniques and practices, this 
percentage may be set as high as 100%. See id. Should the defendant fail to satisfactorily 
complete a SEP, EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy requires settlement docu-
ments to include stipulated penalty provisions. See id. at 24,803. 
210 See id. at 24,802. 
211 Cf S. REP. No. 91-;')52 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2311 (enacting legis-
lation dealing with the deductibility of antitrust damage payments in which the U.S. Senate 
stated that "[fJrom the standpoint of antitrust policy, the basic issues are the extent of the 
penalties intended and whether their impact should be reduced by permitting them to reduce 
taxes which otherwise would have to be paid"). 
212 See 1bdres, supra note 1, at 716-17. 
218 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2672 (1992), a/I'd without opinion, 54 F.3d 767 (3d Cir. 1995). 
214 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990). 
216 880 F.2d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
216 73 T.C. 1226 (1980). 
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facturing wastes into local waterways.217 On October 5, 1976, Allied 
was sentenced to pay the maximum criminal fine on all counts, a total 
fine of $13,240,000.218 At sentencing, the judge wanted to punish the 
company and deter other corporate polluters.219 He also reiterated his 
wish that the fines could be used to benefit directly the people of Vir-
ginia who were hurt by the company's actions, but he was "satisfied 
... that this cannot be done under the law."220 The judge ordered the 
fine paid in ninety days, but indicated that he would entertain a 
motion to reduce the fine at the end of ninety days.221 He further 
stated that the ninety-day period was not a probationary period and 
that he could not and would not require the company to take any 
actions as a condition of probation.222 
The taxpayer's lawyers were concerned that the creation of a non-
profit, tax-exempt foundation or trust to remedy the environmental 
harm could subject the company to a shareholder suit for waste of 
corporate assets.223 However, they felt that if the company was able 
to deduct the voluntary payments from taxes and received a reduc-
tion in fine equal, for example, to seventy-five percent of the amount 
paid, then the defense to any such suit would be that the payments 
resulted in a net after tax benefit to the Company.224 Although the 
217 See Allied-Signal, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2676. Each of the 940 counts represented a single 
day's discharge; 628 counts were for THEIC and TAlC (both are biologically inactive chemicals 
used in commercial wire manufacturing), 225 counts for Kepone (a highly toxic chemical pesti-
cide), and 87 counts for TAlC and Kepone. See id. at 2673, 2675. 
218 See id. at 2677. The fine was $2,500 per count for counts 1-456 and $25,000 per count for 
counts 457-940. See id. 
219 See id. The judge stated: 
[d. 
I hope after this sentence, that every corporate official, every corporate employee that 
has any reason to think that pollution is going on, will think, "If I don't do something 
about it now, I am apt to be out of a job tomorrow." I want the officials to be concerned 
when they see it. 
220 See id. 
221 See id. The judge further stated: 
[d. 
Now, so there be no misunderstanding, this is not a suggestion that the Court will 
reduce the fines. I intend to and will consider what actions, if any, have been voluntarily 
taken by the defendant corporation to alleviate the horrendous effects that have 
occurred. ' 
In no event, do I want any actions done under any compulsion whatsoever. Any 
action it would take should be taken voluntarily. In no event would a reduction, if there 
is a reduction, be in an amount equal to whatever they may voluntarily expend. I am 
not, however, closing my mind to consideration of an appropriate adjustment. 
222 See Allied-Signal, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2677. 
223 See id. 
224 See id. 
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taxpayer never received any binding assurances during the ninety-
day period, as a result of numerous contacts with the judge during 
that period, the taxpayer was virtually certain that any "voluntary" 
payments would be recognized at the hearing on the motion to reduce 
the fine.226 The taxpayer decided to establish an endowment fund for 
the broad purpose of alleviating the effects of the violations on the 
environment and the lives of affected persons and generally to im-
prove and enhance the quality of the environment in Virginia.226 
The local U.S. Attorney, acting on behalf of the Department of 
Justice, first learned of the endowment and the company's proposal 
for the contribution of $8 million to the fund at the hearing on the 
motion to reduce the fine.227 The u.s. Attorney opposed the motion to 
reduce the fine on the ground that the taxpayer would probably try 
to claim a tax deduction for the payment to the endowment and thus 
effectively further reduce the fine and lessen its intended penal and 
deterrent purpose.228 The court modified the sentence, reducing the 
fine to $5 million by suspending some of the fines and putting the 
company on probation.229 No part of the fine was actually paid to the 
court or contributed to the endowment until the day after the sen-
tence was modified.230 
The taxpayer's attempt to claim the $8 million transferred to the 
endowment as a deduction under section 162(a) was denied by the Tax 
Court under section 162(0.231 The court reasoned that the payment 
225 See id. at 2677--80, 2682. 
226 See id. at 2680. The Virginia Environmental Endowment Fund was created as a section 
501(c)(4) organization. See id. Corporate payments to a section 501(c)(4) organization would be 
claimed under section 162(a) as an ordinary and necessary business expense, and is not subject 
to the limitations on deductibility applicable to organizations created under section 501(c)(3) in 
which payments are claimed under section 170. See id.; compare I.R.C. § 162(a) (allowing 
payments from a corporation to a § 501(c)(4) charity to be deducted in full in the current year), 
with I.R.C. § 17O(b)(2), (d)(2) (limiting payments from a corporation to a § 501(c)(4) charity to 
10% of corporation's taxable income for the current and succeeding five years, with any unused 
deduction expiring after five years). 
2'Z1 See Allied-Signal, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2680. 
228 See id. 
229 See id. The fines for counts 741-940 remained at $25,000 per count, and the fines for counts 
1-740 were eliminated with the taxpayer put on probation instead. See id. 
23J See id; see also Morton Mintz & Daniel Klaidman, Creative Settlement or Improper Deal, 
LEGAL TiMES, May 11, 1992, at 1 (discussing questionable aspects of the settlement process, 
including: ex parte meetings between taxpayer's attorneys and judge, one of whom was a former 
law clerk and associate at judge's law firm; judge reserving right to appoint chairman of the 
endowment fund; judge appointing the U.S. Attorney who opposed the motion to reduce the 
fine as the chairman of the endowment fund; et cetera). 
231 See Allied-Signal, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2683. 
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was not voluntary because it was made with the expectation of a quid 
pro quo reduction in the amount of the fine.232 The court found that 
although the judge indicated that the fine had a dual purpose, based 
on the facts and circumstances, the purpose of the payment was 
punitive and if there were any compensatory or remedial purposes, 
they were minimal.233 The court also stated, "[ w]e do not believe that 
a Government must actually 'pocket' the fine or penalty to satisfy the 
'paid to a government' requirement of section 162(0.''234 
In True v. United States, the district court held that a civil penalty 
under section 311(b)(6) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
was deductible because the Act employed a strict liability standard 
as an essentially compensatory scheme to shift the cost of pollution 
from the public to the polluter.236 The district court was also persuaded 
in part by the fact that the penalty was used to finance the cost of 
cleaning up oil spills when costs were not otherwise recoverable.236 On 
appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the 
legislative history of section 162(0 indicated that Congress intended 
that some strict liability penalties are nondeductible.237 The court 
examined the statute and found that section 311(b)(6) served a deter-
rent and retributive function similar to a fine.238 Moreover, since a 
wholly independent provision in the statute authorizing the govern-
ment to recoup cleanup costs appeared to be the primary compensa-
tory or remedial mechanism, the penalty section of section 311(b)(6) 
must serve as an additional sanction to deter and punish.239 The court 
held that the civil penalty was punitive and thus nondeductible even 
though it conceded that "employment of the proceeds ... to adminis-
ter the Act and to finance cleanup costs actually does serve a remedial 
purpose.''240 
In Colt Industries, Inc. v. United States, EPA recommended that 
the Department of Justice institute a civil action against the tax-
payer's subsidiary for violation of the Clean Air Act and the Clean 
232 See id. at 2681. The quid pro quo aspect would also present difficulties had the taxpayer 
structured the payment as a charitable contribution to a section 501(c)(3) organization. See 
generally I.R.C. § 170 (1997). 
233 See Allied-Signal, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2682. 
21!4 [d. at 2683 (quoting Waldman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1384, 1389 (1987». 
235 803 F. Supp. 1370, 1374 (D. Wyo. 1985), rev'd, 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990). 
236 See id. 
237 See 7rue, 894 F.2d at 1205. 
238 See id. 
239 See id. at 1205--06. 
240 See id. at 1205. 
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Water Act.241 A settlement was reached whereby the subsidiary paid 
$1.6 million to the Pennsylvania Clean Air and Clean Water Fund in 
satisfaction of the civil penalties.242 The Claims Court denied the de-
duction, holding that the penalties assessed under the statutes con-
stituted a "fine or similar penalty paid to a government for the viola-
tion of any law" for which a deduction was barred by section 162(t).243 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court, but had a 
very unusual reasoning.2M In addition to interpreting the 1971 U.S. 
Senate Finance Committee Report differently from other courts, the 
Federal Circuit held that its role was only to determine the validity 
of the regulations.245 The court stated: 
[A]ccording to Colt, the court would have to "detennine the pur-
pose or purposes served by the specific civil penalty payment at 
issue in order to ascertain whether the payment is barred from 
deduction." But that is not our office; "Congress has delegated to 
the Commissioner, not to the courts, the task of prescribing 'all 
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement' of the Internal 
Revenue Code .... In this area of limitless factual variations, 'it 
is the province of Congress and the Commissioner, not the courts, 
to make the appropriate adjustments.'" 
As is apparent, neither the statute nor the regulations prescribe 
a "purpose" inquiry. It is therefore beyond our mandate to embark 
on one to make our own assessment of the deductibility of a 
particular penalty. "The role of the judiciary in cases of this sort 
begins and ends with assuring that the Commissioner's regula-
tions fall within his authority to implement the congressional 
mandate in some reasonable manner."246 
The final environmental case is S & B Restaurant, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner.247 The taxpayer, which was discharging raw sewage from its 
motel and restaurant business into an underground waterway, en-
tered into an agreement with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
under its Clean Streams Law.248 The restaurant agreed to make 
monthly payments to the Clean Water Fund until a central municipal 
241 880 F.2d 1311, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
242 See id. at 1313. 
243 See id. at 1312. 
244 See Todres, supra note 1, at 680. 
245 See Colt Indus., 880 F.2d at 1314. 
246 Id. at 1314 (quoting Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 296 (1967); United States v. 
Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967». 
247 73 T.C. 1226 (1980). 
248 See id. 
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sewer system became available and the restaurant connected to, and 
discharged its waste into, that system.249 The Tax Court noted that 
the Clean Streams Law had punitive aspects (provided for criminal 
and civil penalties), but also was in furtherance of the policy to dis-
courage separate treatment facilities and develop a comprehensive 
program of regional control and management of the treatment of 
sewage disposal.260 Since the statute had a dual purpose, the court had 
to determine which purpose the payments in question were designed 
to serve.261 The court concluded that the payments were in further-
ance of the purpose of the statute to control pollution through consoli-
dated, rather than individual, facilities.262 The court held that the pay-
ments were made by the taxpayer in consideration of being allowed 
to continue to discharge its sewage waste, rather than as a fine or 
similar penalty imposed by the law or "settlement of the taxpayer's 
actual or potential liability for a fine or penalty."253 The court recog-
nized that the settlement agreement provided that the taxpayer 
would not be prosecuted for the violations, but viewed this as merely 
incidental to the main purpose of the agreement which was to ensure 
that the taxpayer would join the municipal disposal system.264 More-
over, the court noted that the agreement not to prosecute was condi-
tioned upon the continuation of the quality and quantity of the sewage 
discharges not exceeding those contemplated by the agreement.255 
III. STRUCTURING ENVIRONMENTAL MONETARY SANCTIONS 
In trying to structure environmental monetary sanctions, one is 
struck by how disparate the bodies of tax law and environmental law 
249 See id. 
250 See id. at 123~3. 
251 See id. at 1232. 
262 See S & B Restaurant, 73 T.C. at 1232. 
253 See id. The court rested its conclusion on several grounds: 1) the taxpayer was obligated 
to connect into the municipal sewer, when it became available, and since the payments were to 
continue only until such time, the indefiniteness of the total amount made it distinguishable in 
some degree from a fine or penalty which is usually fixed in amount; 2) the special assistant 
attorney general fixed the payment based upon his belief of what the charges would have been 
had the municipal facility been available; 3) the State would have attempted to block any 
attempt by the taxpayer to construct its own sewage treatment facilities; and 4) the special 
assistant attorney general was led to believe that no practical environmental harm would be 
caused by the continued discharge of sewage waste, and regardless of whether this was tech-
nically correct, his understanding of the underlying basis for the agreement gave direction to 
its objective and thereby to the purpose of the payment. See id. at 1232---33. 
254 See id. at 1233. 
266 See id. 
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are from each other. Although the body of tax law is much maligned 
for its volume and complexity, the I.R.C. is a framework that provides 
structure to this area. By comparison, not only is the body of environ-
mental laws and regulations more voluminous and arguably more 
complex,256 it lacks any comparable framework. 
A. Structuring Monetary Sanctions to Maintain Thx Deductibility 
From the tax perspective, which environmental monetary sanc-
tions are deductible is straight-forward, at least in theory.267 Crimi-
nal fines clearly are not deductible.268 On the other hand, compensa-
tory payments clearly are deductible.269 If the statute giving rise to 
the claim has multiple purposes, the court must determine which 
purpose will govern.260 If a monetary sanction is comprised of two 
or more components, the tax treatment of each component of the 
monetary sanction must be determined separately.261 Generally, civil 
penalties imposed for purposes of enforcing the law and as punish-
ment for the violation thereof are nondeductible payments under 
section 162(f), while civil penalties imposed to encourage prompt com-
pliance with a requirement of the law, or as a remedial measure to 
compensate another party for expenses incurred as a result of the 
violation, fall outside the scope of the deduction prohibition in section 
162(f).262 
The origin of the liability test is used to determine the deductibility 
of a payment when an actual or potential claim against the taxpayer 
has been settled.263 In each case, any payments made retain the char-
acterization of the underlying claim, rather than the use to which the 
payments are put.264 To the extent that a payment is made before 
charges are brought (i.e., demonstrating that the business is a good 
256 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 72. "[T]he federal and state environmental agency 
structures and their regulations and guidelines, like the EPA Penalty Policy, have proliferated 
since the early 1970s into a quantum of public law that is now far more complex and voluminous 
than the Internal Revenue Code and its rules." [d. 
257 See Todres, supra note 1, at 716. 
256 See 'freas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(1)(i). 
269 See id. § 1.162-21(b)(2). 
260 See Middle At!. Distrib., Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1136, 1144-45 (1979). 
261 See Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667, 673 (2d Cir. 1990). 
262 See Bailey v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d 44, 46-47 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing Southern Pac. 'Iransp. 
Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 646--54 (1980); accord Huff v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 804, 824 
(1983); Middle Atlantic, 72 T.C. at 1136). 
268 See Todres, supra note 1, at 702-03. 
284 See id. at 703-M. 
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citizen), it may be possible to argue that the payment was voluntary 
and therefore deductible.266 Payments made after formal charges are 
brought are nondeductible under section 162(0 if they are made with 
the expectation of quid pro quo or in settlement of an actual or 
potentialliability.266 From a policy standpoint, one may wonder what 
would and should occur if a taxpayer did in fact make a truly volun-
tary payment that the judge later expressly took into account by 
imposing a fine lower than might otherwise have been imposed.267 
Even though a portion of the monetary sanction may be nonde-
ductible, courts can preserve the deductibility of amounts paid as 
restitution, or to remedy harms, by carefully delineating the amount 
that is a fine from that which is restitution or some other monetary 
sanction.266 
B. Structuring Environmental Sentences and Settlements to 
Remedy Local Harms 
From an environmental perspective, there appears to be some lati-
tude in structuring environmental sentences and settlements. N ot-
withstanding certain institutional difficulties and societal costs, in an 
appropriate case, imposing and implementing environmentally bene-
ficial projects is often better public policy than a sentence which 
merely requires paying a fine to the federal government.269 
It appears possible to structure sentences and settlements that 
allow the money to stay local to provide restitution to the victim and 
remediate the environment for those most affected by the damage 
caused by the violation. In criminal actions, the Guidelines state that 
as a general principle, the court should require that the defendant 
take all appropriate steps to provide compensation to victims and 
otherwise remedy the harm caused or threatened by the offense.270 
The Sentencing Reform Act and the organizational sentencing guide-
lines clearly authorize courts to impose conditions of probation in 
order to ''repair'' or "remedy" the harm caused by the offense or 
eliminate or reduce the future risk ofharm.271 In civil actions, the court 
266 See Schnee, supra note 22, at 21. 
266 See id. 
26'7 See 'Ibdres, supra note 1, at 679--80. 
268 See Harrell, supra note 7, at 275. 
Z69 See id. at 247. 
270 See U.S.S.G., supra note 141, at § 8B introductory commentary at 343. 
m See Harrell, supra note 7, at 271. 
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arguably can use its equitable discretion to order remedies, unless 
precluded by the underlying statute.272 Environmentally beneficial 
projects which a defendant agrees to undertake, but is not otherwise 
legally obligated to perform, whether in a criminal or civil action, can 
obtain environmental and public health protection and improvements 
which otherwise might not be achieved.273 A government official who 
has the authority to settle an enforcement case also has the authority 
to approve a SEP.274 EPA settlement policy, in addition to imposing 
monetary sanctions to punish and deter violators, recognizes that 
SEPs play an important remedial role.276 Although EPA does not offer 
tax advice on whether the violator may deduct SEP expenditures 
from its income taxes, if the violator decides to take the deduction, 
EPA will increase the amount that must be expended on the SEP to 
calculate what is an acceptable settlement.276 While the parties' char-
acterization of the settlement is not necessarily determinative, the 
courts and the IRS do consider the terms of the settlement agreement 
in considering whether that component of the monetary sanction is 
tax deductible.277 
CONCLUSION 
Section 162(0 is an effective provision that has accomplished its 
framers' intent.278 The provision seems to be flexible-some would 
argue, perhaps too flexible.279 In certain instances, it is possible for 
judges and attorneys to keep some money local by carefully delineat-
ing the amount which is a fine, from that which is restitution or some 
other form of monetary sanction.280 Such structuring may also make 
it possible to obtain a tax deduction that can be factored into setting 
the sentence or settlement. For taxpayers with limited economic 
resources, a socially desirable trade-off can be achieved. Monetary 
2'l2 See Nghiem, supra note 187, at 581-84 (arguing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 465 U.S. 
305 (1982), authorizes expansion of judicial equitable discretion in civil actions to remedy 
environmental harms). 
273 See 1995 EPA CIVIL PENALTY POLICIES, supra note 187, at 1,4. 
274 See id. at 38. Subject to few exceptions, no special approvals are required for the govern-
ment official to approve a SEP. See id. 
276 See id. at 6. 
276 See id. at 31. 
277 See supra note 60-77 and accompanying text. 
278 See Todres, supra note 1, at 717. 
279 See id. 
2BO See Harrell, supra note 7, at 275. 
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sanctions can be structured so that less money is paid to the federal 
government, and more money kept local to remediate the harm and 
provide relief to the victims. 
